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Abstract
The technology on infrared remote control is widely applied in human daily life. It is also applied in the
place with a top security level. Infrared remote control signal is regarded as a simple, safe and clean
resource that can help us control the electrical appliances nearby. In this paper, we build IREXF, a novel
infrared optical covert channel from a well-protected air-gapped network via a malicious infrared module
implanted previously into a keyboard. A malware preinstalled in the air-gapped PC receives the data
from the malicious infrared module to study the infrared surroundings in the air-gapped network. Once
a suitable appliance is found, infrared remote control commands will be sent in a proper time. With
the development of technology on Internet of Things, more and more electrical appliances can access
Internet. Those infrared command signals exfiltrating out of the air-gapped network can be received by
an appliance without any malicious configuration. In our experiment, via a smart TV set-top box, the
rate of the covert channel can be up to 2.62 bits per second without any further optimization. Finally,
we give a list of countermeasures to detect and eliminate this kind of covert channels.
Keywords: Covert Channel; Data Exfiltration; Air-gapped; Infrared Signal; Remote Control
I Introduction
The concept of Covert Channel was given by Lamp-
son in 1973 to refer to those channels that are not
used for normal communication.[14] He found that
the shared resources could be abused by the pro-
cesses in different privilege levels to circumvent the
security mechanism. With the development of net-
work technology, many kinds of cover channel were
∗Project Site: home.ustc.edu.cn/∼zhou7905/IREXF
found in past twenty years. Zander et al surveyed
the network covert channels in different kinds of
networks protocols in 2007. [29]
In order to protect against the threats of network
covert channels, physical isolation is conducted in
almost every top-secret organization to keep the
networks with high level separated from the less
secure and Internet. This type of isolation is known
as air-gapped. Nevertheless, an air-gapped network
is still not strong enough to eliminate the leakage
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
03
21
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 J
an
 20
18
of sensitive data.
A lot of methods were proposed to breach the
air-gapped networks in the last decade. There are
four kinds of covert channel to bridge the air gap:
• Electro-magnetic covert channels,
• Acoustic covert channels,
• Thermal covert channels, and
• Optical covert channels.
Electro-magnetic covert channels: Kuhn
and Anderson proposed firstly the method[13] to
transmit information covertly using electromag-
netic radiation in 1998. Guri et al introduced
AirHopper[5], a type of malware, leak data be-
tween a mobile phone and a computer nearby using
FM radio module in 2014. Guri et al introduced
a malware named GSMem[4], which leak data via
electromagnetic radiation generated by the bus of
computer memory in 2015. Guri et al proposed
USBee[6], which can be used to leak data via elec-
tromagnetic radiation generated by the USB cable
in 2016. In 2016, Matyunin et al used the mag-
netic field sensor in mobile device to build a covert
channel.[19]
Acoustic covert channels: In 2013, Hanspach
and Goetz used the acoustical devices: speakers
and microphones of the notebook computer to build
a covert channel[12]. Malley et al[21] introduced
a covert communication over inaudible sounds in
2014. Lee et al[15] uses a loud-speaker as an acous-
tical input device, and make a speaker-to-speaker
covert channel in 2015. Guri et al introduced
Fansmitter[8] and DiskFiltration[9], new methods
to send acoustic signals without speakers in 2016.
Thermal covert channels: In 2015, Guri et al
introduced BitWhisper[7], to build a unique bidi-
rectional thermal covert channel via the heat radi-
ated with another adjacent PC. In 2017, Mirsky et
al proposed HVACKer[20], to build a one-way ther-
mal covert channel from an air conditioning system
to an air-gapped network.
The thermal covert channels in the multi-cores
CPU is researched as follows: Mast built a ther-
mal covert channel in multi-cores[18] with a trans-
mit rate of 12.5bits per second in 2015. Bar-
tolini studied the capacity of a thermal covert
channel in multi-cores[1] in 2016. Selber propose
UnCovert3[22], a new thermal covert channel in
multi-cores with a transmit rate of 20 bits per sec-
ond in 2017.
Optical covert channels: Loughry and
Umphres studied the exfiltration via LED
indicators[17] in 2002. They divided LED indi-
cators into three classes. Class I includes the
unmodulated LEDs used to indicate some state of
the device; Class II is refer to the time-modulated
LEDs correlated with the activity level of the
device; Class III involves the modulated LEDs
that are strongly correlated with the content of
data being processed. They found that TD LED
indicators on almost every modem of those years
belong to Class III. Even an LED indicator on a
DES encryptor leaks plain data. They indicated
that although the LEDs in Class II are not so
dangerous as those in Class III, but they can be
modulated to leak significant signal, and can be
used to build covert channels.
Sepetnitsky proposed a covert channel prototype
[23] of leaking data to the camera in a smart phone
via the monitor’s power status LED indicator in
2014. Shamir presented a cover channel to breach
an air-gapped network [24] by a light-based printer
in 2014. Lopes and Aranha proposed a malicious
device[16] to leak data via its flickering infrared
LEDs. In 2016, Guri introduced VisiSploit[3], a
prototype to leak data via an invisible QR-code
in LCD screen. Guri presented LED-it-GO[11], to
leak data via hard drive LED indicators in 2017.
Guri also proposed xLED[10], to leak data via sta-
tus LED indicators on the routers in 2017. Zhou
introduced KLONC[30], a prototype to leak sen-
sitive information from an air-gapped network to
a network surveillance camera via the status LED
indicators on the keyboard in 2017.
There is a kind of optical covert channel to leak
data via infrared signal that is invisible to human
view. In 2016, Lopes and Aranha presented a ma-
licious flash disk to leak data via infrared signal
with a transmit rate of 15 bits per second.[16] Guri
introduced a prototype to realize both exfiltration
and infiltration of the data via infrared signal by
circumventing an safety surveillance system.[2]
Lopes’ prototype[16] still needs a malicious in-
ternal person who holds a receiver to obtain the
infrared signal. It is very difficult to be realized in
the place with a high secret level.
In our prototype, IREXF(the brief of “infrared
exfiltration”), a novel infrared optical covert chan-
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Figure 1: HP Keyboard Embedded with Malicious
Hardware
nel is established from a well-pretected air-gapped
network via a malicious infrared module implanted
previously into a keyboard shown in Figure 1. A
malware preinstalled in the air-gapped PC receives
the infrared signal from the malicious infrared mod-
ule to study the infrared surroundings in the air-
gapped network. After it finds a suitable appliance
to control, it can select a proper time to send an in-
frared command. Then the infrared optical signal
exfiltrates out of the air-gapped network. Accord-
ing the type of appliances, the sensitive data can be
modulated into the behavior control infrared sig-
nals to the appliance.
Because the infrared signal is used for its original
purpose. It is very difficult to distinguish between
the real ones created from a remote controller by
human being and the fake ones modulated from an
infrared LED by the malicious hardware. It leads
a lower probability to be checked out.
We find that in the background of IoT(Internet
of Things), it is not necessary to control both sides
of the covert channel as we do traditionally. As
long as the operation method of a smart device is
known, the device would be exploited maliciously
rather than be hacked directly.
The contributions of our research are as follows:
1. A set of malicious hardware is designed to ful-
fill the attack to an air-gapped network. It is
available for a supply chain attack;
2. A prototype of data exfiltration from an air-
gapped network via infrared remote control
signals is proposed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Background technology is given in Section II. A
prototype, IREXF, is proposed in Section III. Sec-
tion IV presents results and a discussion. Counter-
measures are given in Section V, and we draw our
conclusions in Section VI.
II Background Technology
A Infrared Transmition
Infrared was discovered in 1800 by William Her-
schel. Infrared radiation is used in industrial, scien-
tific, and medical applications, especially in short-
ranged wireless communication. Infrared is the
most common way for remote controls to command
appliances.[25] There are over ten infrared tran-
sition protocols: ITT, NEC, Nokia NRC, Sharp,
Philips RC-5, Philips RC-6, Philips RECS-80 and
Sony SIRC etc. The protocols are used to prevent
surrounding infrared from interfering with the re-
mote control signals.
Carrier wave is the key to distinguish the right
signal to receive. For example, the infrared sensor
HS0038B made by Vishay Telefunken can receive
the signals with carrier frequency range of 35KHz
to 41KHz with peak detection at 38KHz. Mean-
while, an HS0038B can receive all protocols.
TX
R2
10kΩ
+5V
R1100Ω
C1100µF
2 13
HS0038B
Figure 2: Circuit to Receive Infrared Signal by
HS0038B
The circuit for HS0038B is shown in Figure 2.
The resistor R1 is a current-limiting resistor, and
resistor R2 is a pull-high resistor to keep a high level
on the node TX while no infrared signal is received
by HS0038B. The capacitor C1 is a filter capacitor
to maintain a constant voltage for HS0038B. A low
level signal is output on the node TX while any
infrared signal is received.
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Meanwhile, the infrared diodes can be used in an
amplifier circuit.
S8050
R1
200Ω
RX
+5V
IN5819
F3MM
R2
20Ω
Figure 3: Amplifier Circuit to Send Infrared Signal
In Figure 3, the infrared light-emitting
diode(LED) is labeled as F3MM . And IN5819 is
a normal diode to protect the triode S8050 from an
inverse voltage by any mistake. Both resistor R1
and resistor R2 are current-limiting resistors. the
infrared diode F3MM will send infrared radiation
while a high level signal is kept on the node RX.
B Raspberry Pi
The Raspberry Pi is a series of small single-board
computers developed in the United Kingdom by the
Raspberry Pi Foundation to promote the teaching
of basic computer science in schools and in devel-
oping countries.[26] It serves as a controller for the
infrared sensor and transmitter very well. And it is
very easy to exchange data via its GPIO(General-
Purpose Input/Output) bus with both sensors and
the air-gapped PC.
The Raspberry Pi boots its OS since the power
supply is available. Then it receives signals from
the infrared sensor via GPIO continuously.
C USB Adapter
A USB adapter is a type of protocol converter
which is used for converting USB data signals to
and from other communications standards. Most
commonly the USB data signals are converted to
either RS232, RS485, RS422, or TTL-level UART
serial data. [27]
In our prototype, we use a USB-TTL adapter to
simulate a serial port on the air-gapped PC. Any-
one linking the port with correct parameters can
receive or send data with TTL-level signals.
Sensitive data
Signals on TTL
Sent by Malware
IR Remote Control Signals
Sent by Malicous Infrared Module
Behaviors of Appliance
Received by Normal Aplliance
Signals Outside or Data via Internet
Sensed Remotely
Raw Data
Received by a Sink
Restored Sensitive Sata Demodulation or Decoding
Figure 4: Flow diagram of IREXF
III Attack Model
A Scenario
An attack flow diagram is shown in Figure 4, a
malicious infrared module is implanted into a key-
board before the PC is given to its user(that is
Supply Chain Attack), or when the PC is main-
tained by an attacker. Meanwhile, a malware is
also preinstalled on the PC. The malware runs in
the background while the PC is working. It seeks
the sensitive data on the PC and copy them with a
strong encryption. On the other hand, the malware
receives data from the malicious infrared module to
study the infrared surroundings in the air-gapped
network. By checking up a signal table, it can judge
the type and the brand of the electrical appliances,
and find a suitable appliance to control. Then, at a
proper time, it sends infrared remote control com-
mands to the appliance and the infrared optical sig-
nals exfiltrate out of the air-gapped network.
Because of the variety of the electrical appliances,
the modulation forms of the signal are different.
When the appliance is a traditional air-condition
without accessing Internet, the signal can be mod-
ulated into the behaviors of sending a serious of in-
frared remote control commands. Then a receiver
can be set out of the building near the air con-
ditioner external unit; If the appliance is a smart
air-condition that can be controlled via Internet,
the signal can be modulated into some certain con-
figuration value that can be easily read by an at-
tacker who access the air-condition by an APP; If
the appliance is a smart TV set, the signal can be
modulated into a serious of infrared remote control
commands to visit a malicious website with a long
URL that involves the sensitive data.
In our prototype, IREXF, a smart TV box serves
as a receiver. It is very easy to see this scenario in
a control room with top secret: flat-panel TV sets
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are hung on the wall in front of some air-gapped
PCs that are handled by the operator on duty.
B Transmitter
B.1 Malicious Infrared Module
The malicious infrared module to send the infrared
commands is made up of follows:
1. a USB-TTL adapter, which can simulate a se-
rial port on the air-gapped PC;
2. a Raspberry Pi, which can
• detect the surrounding infrared signals,
and
• record the signals and transmit them to
the air-gapped PC via TTL, and
• send the infrared signals to infrared LED
via GPIO.
The malicious infrared module is link to the USB
port on the PC in a hidden way. In our prototype,
the module is embedded in a USB keyboard. Hence
a USB hub is also needed to give another port.
B.2 Malware on PC
A malware is also required to be installed on the
air-gapped PC. It can:
• fetch the sensitive information on the host
• study the infrared signal from the malicious
infrared module to make the infrared signal
surrounding clear. Then it knows the type and
the brand of the electrical appliances nearby.
• give the malicious infrared module commands
to send the infrared signal to a certain appli-
ance. The sensitive data is sent by modulation
in same time.
B.3 Study on Infrared Signals
In order to be compatible with more infrared tran-
sition protocols, our prototype is designed to record
and replay a signal’s waveforms directly rather than
analysis its codes. The infrared signals are sniffed
and compared with known waveforms to judge their
protocols and the brands of the appliances. The re-
sults of judgments are restored in a database that
can be queried by the malware in the air-gapped
PC.
C Receiver
A lot of appliances can be the receivers with the de-
velopment of IoT. A receiver must has the following
characters:
• can be controlled by infrared signals, and
• can access Internet, or can be related with an-
other appliance outdoor.
Any appliance meeting the two conditions above
can be used as a receiver. After an investigation,
we find that the smart TV sets, the smart air-
conditions and the traditional air-conditions are
most available in a high frequency. So, in our pro-
totype, IREXF, a smart TV set-top box serves as
the receiver.
Smart TV set or TV with STB: Android is
the most popular mobile OS nowadays. More and
more TV sets ship Android to enrich the functions
and give a more wonderful experience to users. As
a needful function, the network browser can access
the websites on Internet. Naturally, the browser
can be control by an infrared remote controller.
Smart Air-condition: Smart air-conditions
become the mainstream, since a consumer can turn
his air-condition on via Internet before he come
back home. The temperature value and running
mode etc. can be accessed and controlled with the
APP on his mobile phone. Without question, a
smart air-condition can also be controlled by an in-
frared remote controller.
Traditional Air-condition: Not only smart
electrical appliances, the traditional ones can also
be used to build a covert channel, as long as they
have any relation with another appliance outside
the building. Traditional air-conditions just meet
this condition.
IV Results and Discussion
A Experiment Setting
In our prototype named IREXF, we build a covert
channel from an air-gapped PC to Internet or a
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lower security level network by infrared remote con-
trol signals that are modulated by a malicious hard-
ware embedded previously with a supply chain at-
tack.
A.1 Hardware configuration
The malicious hardware is made up of follows:
Infrared Receiver and Transmitter: We use
an infrared LED F3MM to replace the normal LED
on the location of Scroll Lock, which is seldom used
now. An infrared sensor HS0038B serving as an
infrared signal sniffer can hides itself behind the
translucent plastic panel on a keyboard or any-
where can receive optical signals easily. The cir-
cuits of them is redesigned into one shown in Figure
5 to shorten its size into 1.9cm x 2.6cm.
S8050
R1
200Ω
RX
TX
IN5819
R2
20Ω
GND GND
+5V +5V
TX RX
R3 10kΩ
R4 100Ω
C1 100µF
VCC
Figure 5: Circuit for Both F3MM and HS0038B
Raspberry Pi: Among all type of Raspberry
Pi, the Raspberry Pi Zero has the smallest size:
6.5cm x 3.0cm x 0.5cm. Hence it is available to be
embedded in a normal-sized keyboard.
Others: A USB hub, and a USB-TTL adapter
are also needed.
Hardware Host Object: An HP keyboard
with model KU-1156 shown in Figure 6 is used as a
host object to accommodate all the malicious hard-
ware:
• HS0038B, F3MM, and their circuit board;
• Raspberry Pi Zero and a USB-TTL adapter;
• A USB hub.
Figure 6: Inside the Keyboard with Malicious
Hardware
A.2 Sink of Covert Channel
A Skyworth Network Set-Top Box Q+ 2th, which is
one of the most popular TV set-top boxes in China,
is used.
A web site written in Django can be access by
the TV box. It receives the covert data and restore
them into an SQLITE database.
A.3 Experimental Environment
In our prototype, we assume that there is a TV
set with a network set-top box in the same room
of an air-gapped PC. It is a common scenario in a
control room: a row of computers are placed in the
center of the room. Their screens, keyboards and
mice are put on the desk, and their main boxes are
put under the desk. Several panel TV sets are hung
on the wall in front of the operators. Some of the
panels are used to display the key information of
the systems they control. One of the panels is used
to play TV shows in real time. In the place with
a high security level, any personal smart device is
banned. So it is very necessary and reasonable to
place a TV set to remove loneliness and disorienta-
tion of an operator on a long-timed duty.
A.4 Conversation from Text to Remote
Control Commands
The users of a TV box can not input text directly
using a remote controller. The buttons on the con-
troller of Skyworth TV box is shown in the Figure
7. When a user want to input some words, a few
buttons they can use such as ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘left’,
6
Figure 7: Controller of TV box
‘right’ and ‘ok’. An IME(Enput Method Editor)
APP, such as Baidu TV IME will be set active to
give a help to the user.
So, we designed a conversation algorithm to con-
vert the words(made up of numbers and letters)
into a serials of remote control commands. In Baidu
TV IME, there are four keyboards in English mode:
lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers and
symbols. We made four tables to record the loca-
tions of every byte. Then a path from a byte to
another can be calculated out by considering the
difference of their locations. The initial locations
of the former three keyboards are always on ‘q’,
‘Q’ and ‘1’. The flow diagram of the conversation
algorithm is shown in Figure 8.
B Results
B.1 Existence of Covert Channel
In one of our experiments, we sent the string
“KeyboardisOKon20180104ThankyouUSTC” with
the length of 34 bytes. Firstly, a serials of com-
mands would be sent to change the input source
of the TV set and order the TV box to open the
browser APP. It took 9 second to fulfill this proce-
Start
is the position of dst?
EndMove Right Move Left Move UpMove Down
Move to the keyboard of dst Yes
is same keyboard of dst?
No
No
is same row of dst?
Yes
is left side of dst?
Yes
is over dst?
No
Yes No NoYes
Figure 8: Flow diagram of Conversation Algorithm
dure. Then we waited 10 seconds for the start of
the APP. Secondly, we sent the commands to in-
put the prefix in the URL textbox. The prefix is
used to indicate the protocol and the site address.
There were 173 commands sent in this procedure
in 39 seconds. Thirdly, the payload of 34 bytes was
sent. It cost 68 seconds. Finally, some commands
are sent to close the browser APP and recovery the
interface back to home and change the input source
of the TV set back in 4 seconds.
We logged in the site accessed by the TV box.
And the access record was found in our database:
15|2018-01-04 07:02:17.652151|
KeyboardisOKon20180104ThankYouUSTC
B.2 Channel Rate
As shown in Figure 9, the command numbers of
moving from one byte to another byte according
to the conversation algorithm designed ahead are
calculated. The axises values from 0 to 63 stand for
the bytes ‘A’∼‘Z’, ‘a’∼‘z’, ‘0’∼‘9’, ‘-’ and ‘ ’ which
can be used to encode data with a modified Base64
for URL[28]. The numbers are various: the smallest
one is 1, when the next byte is just the same one
previous; the biggest one is 24, when they locates
in different keyboard and they are both most far
from the button to change the keyboard, such as
the moving from ‘0’ to ’L’ etc.
The procedure to input a text can be consider as
a Markov Process with 64 status. The transition
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Figure 9: Command Numbers of Moving from one
Byte to Another
probability matrix can be calculated by the statis-
tic on the input texts. Then, the average of the
numbers of moving can be obtained. The rate of
this covert channel will be determined finally.
According to Information Theory, the rate can
be defined as follow:
R =
nH(X)
t
Where, R is the rate, H(X) =
−∑xi∈X P (xi) logP (xi) is the information
entropy of the source X, xi is a codeword of X,
n and t mean that there are n codewords of X
transmitted in the channel in t seconds.
Especially, when all 64 bytes are used with the
same probability(P (xi) =
1
64 ), such as the data is
encoded with Base64, the average of the numbers
of moving is 10.147461. We know that one byte has
6(= − log2 164 ) bits information for Base64. Mean-
while, we measured that it cost 0.225433526 second
on sending a remote control command successfully.
Then, the rate is 2.622861484 bits per second.
C Discussion
C.1 Necessary Conditions
The necessary conditions of the existence of this
kind of covert channels are:
• There is at least one electrical appliance that
can be controlled by infrared remote control
commands.
• There is at least one remote controller that is
often used to send infrared signal which can be
studied by the malicious hardware.
• There is an adequate space in the keyboard to
settle all parts of the malicious hardware.
C.2 Error on Remote Control Commands
When a string would be inputted, any error oc-
curring on the transmission of remote control com-
mands is a fatal one. Because the position of any
followed byte depend on the position of the previ-
ous one. If there is not a pause to reset the position,
a wrong position will impact all subsequent bytes.
In order to facilitate users to input text, Baidu
TV IME introduce the function “ring shift” to
make the moving of highlighted byte more quick.
We find that there is no “ring shift up” when
some bytes are already typed to select on the top
row of IME interface. The highlighted area will
stays on the fist alternative item, no mater how
many ‘up’s are clicked. Hence we can use this char-
acter to give a pause to the procedure of input. An
array of commands: “up, up, up, up, ok” are won-
derful to match all position in the keyboard. Then
the new position is always the initial position(‘q’ or
‘Q’) in current keyboard. A pause is used to reset
the position to avoid continuous errors.
C.3 Covertness
There is an infrared receiver on the malicious hard-
ware. It is used to study the infrared surrounding.
But it also can be used to find an exceptional situa-
tion during the procedure of sending remote control
commands. If a received infrared signal is different
from the one we send, that means there is another
party that sends the infrared command. It is al-
most certain that the party is a controller held by
a people. So, it is not a good time to build a covert
channel. A shell code must be executed to halt the
sending procedure immediately.
C.4 For a Higher Rate
In order to get a higher rate of the covert channel,
we can keep on researching in the following aspects:
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1. Try to shorten the average number of movings
by using the “roll shift” functions in Baidu TV
IME;
2. Try to shorten the number of commands by
using the “word auto-completion” function in
English mode of Baidu TV IME;
3. Try to increase the input speed with a shorter
gap between commands;
4. Shorten the prefix of URL with a shorter do-
main name.
V Countermeasures
The countermeasures are threefold: design counter-
measures, procedural countermeasures and techni-
cal countermeasures.
Design countermeasures can increase the diffi-
culty of exploitation on the appliances receiving
infrared commands. Banning web browser APPs
from a TV Box is designed in some TV set-top
boxes, such as Tmall MagicBox, a famous TV box
brand in China. But the market occupancy of
Tmall MagicBox has been falling down since the
manufacturer banned all the third party APPs from
their boxes.
Procedural countermeasures involve banning In-
ternet from a smart air-condition and covering the
LEDs unused. Both banning Internet and covering
the LEDs are easy to applied, but they make users
inconvenient.
Technical countermeasures involve infrared sig-
nals monitoring with hardware and redundant de-
vice detecting. The aim of the former is to sniff the
infrared signals by a set of infrared receiver. The
latter is used to detect the existence of malicious
hardware. But it is difficult to find the covert chan-
nel out with both of them, since the covert channel
is not in work all the time. Besides, it is also hard
to distinguish the behaviors from a normal remote
controller and the ones from a malicious hardware,
while human behaviors are simulated exactly.
The list of all countermeasures is summarized in
Table 1.
VI Conclusions
A novel method on data exfiltration from an air-
gapped network by infrared remote control signals
was proposed in this paper. With this method,
the normal appliance can be controlled remotely to
help the leakage of sensitive information covertly.
An attack model, IREXF, was introduced to build
a covert channel with a smart TV set-top box con-
trolled by infrared remote control signals sent by
a malicious hardware embedded in the keyboard.
The detection of ambient appliances controlled by
infrared signals was studied. In order to send more
ASCII codes to the covert channel, the conversa-
tion from a text string to a set of remote control
commands was designed. The result of experiment
shows that the rate of IREXF can be up to 2.62
bits per second. The relative issues on this kind of
covert channels are discussed. Finally, countermea-
sures were given by considering the key points on
the flow of this kind of covert channel.
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